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In this issue of CMI, Memish et al. [1] show that circulation of
the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-
CoV) in Saudi Arabia is much lower than was feared,
announced, or predicted. One year after the discovery of this
novel coronavirus, the Saudi Arabian Virology Reference
Laboratory has tested 5065 people for MERS-CoV direct
detection with WHO-recommended real-time RT-PCR tests
[2,3]. Interestingly, no signiﬁcant increase in detection rates
was observed in a period of 1 year. Moreover, mass gatherings
of people in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during the Hajj
pilgrimage in 2012 and 2013 were associated with neither an
increased number of cases nor reported clusters of cases [4],
suggesting poor or moderate interhuman transmission. The
ﬁndings of this important study [1] are congruent with results
reported in approximately 100 peer-reviewed published
studies. They tend to temper the alarming initial predictions
and claims for pandemic potential. On the other hand, one
must remember that the alert dooes not halt the circulation of
common pathogens, which silently cause many more casualties
than the newcomer.
The last decade has witnessed a large number of emerging
or re-emerging infections. It is obvious that improving our
capacity to respond is an important goal. It is important for
preparedness and response programmes to be developed, and
gaps in capacities must be identiﬁed and corrected [5]. These
programmes have to provide the medical community with
detection tools that are applicable in routine diagnostic
laboratories to enable the rapid detection of cases and to
monitor, in a timely manner, the unpredictable dissemination
of emerging pathogens.
When the SARS coronavirus emerged a decade ago, the
discoverers of the virus provided public access to sequence
data, thus allowing all laboratories with reasonable equip-
ment to implement detection of the virus. The same
happened with MERS-CoV weeks after the virus was
discovered [2,3]. In contrast, despite public announcement
of the discovery of dengue 5 virus on 15 October 2013 [6],
sequence data are still not publicly available for diagnotic
purposes, making laboratory preparation for the diagnosis of
dengue 5 impossible for academics and public health
authorities, and resulting in serious gaps in preparedness
and response programmes. The reasons for this long
embargo are not clear, but may relate to intellectual
property issues.
There is no doubt that tackling emerging infections demands
efﬁcient preparedness for rapid risk assessment of the alert.
Regarding this issue, overreaction (which is to be expected
during the ﬁrst weeks after the alert) should be moderated by
the dissemination of reassuring evidence, if any, that the
situation is less catastrophic than initially believed or predicted.
For mysterious reasons, good news is rarely spread with
enthusiasm in public media. Surprisingly, some scientists tend
to follow the same trend, by acting as Cassandras and doom-
mongers even when the scientiﬁc evidence contradicts this
attitude, as exempliﬁed with H5N1 and H7N9 inﬂuenza [7,8].
It is our duty as physicians to avoid disproportionate
reactions, and to have a moderate and wise attitude when it
becomes clear that a newly discovered pathogen is clearly
less dreadful than initially feared: one should not throw oil
on the ﬁre, because focusing attention on one target that is,
in fact, not so serious reduces the amount of attention given
to other agents that cause many more casualties ‘silently’.
Sensationalism must be avoided in medical journals, because
it is in conﬂict with the Hippocratic Oath. One should keep
in mind that ‘the boy who cried wolf’ (in Aesop’s fable) had
a dreadful fate!
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